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INTRODUCTION 
David Kritzik, “a wealthy widower partial to the company of young 
women,” befriended twin sisters Lynnette Harris and Leigh Ann Conley 
and, over several years, gave them each more than half a million dollars.1  
In return, the sisters supplied Kritzik with companionship and sex.2  By the 
time Kritzik died in 1989, neither sister had reported any transfers from 
Kritzik on their income tax returns as taxable income. 
After Kritzik’s death, the Government charged both sisters with in-
come tax evasion, claiming that the cash from Kritzik constituted payments 
for services rendered.3  In their defense, the sisters argued that the transfers 
 
  J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; M.A., English, University of Chicago, 2000.  
I would like to thank Nancy Staudt and Kendra Stead for their insightful comments and suggestions on 
early drafts of this Comment; Laura Baca, Brian Caster, Adair Crosley, and Elana Nightingale Dawson 
for their thoughtful editing of later drafts; and Brian Haag, for editing and support at every stage. 
1  United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1127 (7th Cir. 1991). 
2  See Harris v. Kritzik, 480 N.W.2d 514, 515 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); Martha Atkins, Tax Man Puts 
Squeeze on Sex-for-Hire Kittens, WKLY. WORLD NEWS, June 26, 1990, at 9. 
3  Harris, 942 F.2d at 1127–28, 1130.  The Government charged both sisters under § 7203 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, which provides that “[a]ny person . . . required . . . to make a [tax] return . . . who 
willfully fails to . . . make such return . . . shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty 
of a misdemeanor.”  I.R.C. § 7203 (2006).  It is not clear how the Harris sisters’ potential tax evasion 
came to the attention of the government.  The lower court records of the women’s criminal cases are not 
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constituted gifts4 and thus were not considered taxable income under the In-
ternal Revenue Code (Code).5  The jury agreed with the Government, and 
both women were convicted of criminal willful tax evasion, sentenced to 
prison, and fined.6 
The women appealed.  In United States v. Harris, the Seventh Circuit 
addressed the question of whether transfers to mistresses are properly cate-
gorized as gifts or income.7  The Supreme Court had developed a general 
test for determining whether transfers are gifts or income: the “critical con-
sideration” in this analysis is the donor’s reason for making the transfer.8  If 
“detached and disinterested generosity” motivates the donor, the transfers 
are gifts,9 and the donee need not claim the value of the gifts as taxable in-
come.  However, if the transfers result from “the constraining force of any 
moral or legal duty, constitute[] a reward for services rendered, or proceed[] 
from the incentive of anticipated benefit of an economic nature,” then the 
transfers are income,10 and the donee must include them on her tax return. 
To apply this test to the twin sisters’ situation, the Seventh Circuit had 
to determine whether Kritzik had been motivated by kindly altruism or by 
an expectation that the women would reciprocate.  The court found this test 
almost impossible to apply in this case.  The court could not determine in-
tent: with the donor deceased, the court had to divine his intent from the va-
ried and often conflicting evidence examined at trial.11  Moreover, case law 
provided no assistance: the cases involving transfers to mistresses displayed 
such opaque reasoning and contradictory conclusions that they offered no 
 
available; the briefs submitted on appeal are likewise unavailable.  There are a few possibilities.  An un-
related claim Conley filed with the IRS is mentioned in the opinion, Harris, 942 F.2d at 1128 n.2, and 
may have prompted an investigation.  Harris also initiated numerous suits against Kritzik’s estate in an 
effort to recover the “inheritance” Kritzik had promised her but had not included in his will.  See Harris, 
480 N.W.2d at 516 n.1 (collecting cases Harris filed against Kritzik’s estate).  However, Kritzik died the 
same year the sisters were convicted, so it is not clear that Harris’s suits against Kritzik’s estate preceded 
the criminal investigation.  One source claims that “an anonymous tip” prompted the government’s in-
vestigation of the twins, Atkins, supra note 2, but this assertion is not corroborated elsewhere.  See also 
infra note 64 (describing the different methods the IRS uses to select returns for auditing). 
4  See Harris, 942 F.2d at 1128, 1130. 
5  Section 102(a) of the Code reads: “Gross income does not include the value of property acquired 
by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.”  § 102(a) (2006). 
6  Harris, 942 F.2d at 1127 & n.1.  By the time the Seventh Circuit heard their appeal, both sisters 
had served almost their entire prison sentences.  Id. at 1135 n.7. 
7  See id. at 1127. 
8  Id. (quoting Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1960)). 
9  Id. at 1128 (quoting Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285). 
10  Id. (quoting Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285). 
11  Id. at 1128–29 & n.3.  Kritzik had filed gift tax returns for transfers made to the sisters, which 
could have demonstrated “detached and disinterested generosity.”  Id. at 1128–29 (quoting Duberstein, 
363 U.S. at 285) (quotation mark omitted).  The gift tax imposes a tax on the donor for transfers above a 
particular threshold.  I.R.C. §§ 2501–2503 (2006); see also infra note 205.  At the same time, in affida-
vits created before his death, Kritzik referred to the sisters as “prostitutes.”  Harris, 942 F.2d at 1129 
n.3. 
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clear guidance about distinguishing altruistically motivated transfers from 
those made as payment for services in long-term, nonmarital relationships.12 
The sisters’ convictions could stand only if case law was clear enough 
that they could have violated it willfully.13  Given the ambiguity in the case 
law concerning mistresses, the court had to reverse the sisters’ convictions: 
“current law on the tax treatment of payments to mistresses provided [the 
sisters] no fair warning that [their] conduct was criminal.”14  The sisters 
therefore could not have intentionally violated the law by neglecting to 
claim the transfers as taxable income. 
The Harris decision and the cases the court considered in making it 
highlight the difficulty of distinguishing between income and gifts in long-
term, informal relationships such as those between a mistress and her lover.  
As the Harris court noted, such relationships inevitably contain elements of 
both affection and economic interest: “The relationship would not be long 
term were it not for some respect or affection.  Yet, it may be equally clear 
that the relationship would not continue were it not for financial support or 
payments.”15  Thus, determining a single intent underlying transfers made in 
the course of such a relationship presents the intractable problem of disen-
tangling complex motivations that the parties themselves may be unable to 
identify. 
This Comment examines the cases that the Harris court considered in 
making its decision.  These cases—dubbed “the mistress cases” for the pur-
pose of this Comment16—followed an identifiable pattern.  All concern 
nonmarital relationships during which male lovers transferred money or 
property to their mistresses.  The IRS eventually audited the women’s tax 
returns, discovered the transfers, and assessed deficiencies for unclaimed 
 
12  Harris, 942 F.2d at 1133–34 (citing Jones v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 77,329 (1977); Reis v. 
Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 74,287 (1974); Libby v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 69,184 (1969); Starks v. 
Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 66,134 (1966); Blevins v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 55,211 (1955), aff’d, 238 
F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1956)). 
13  Id. at 1131.  Criminal tax evasion requires willfulness, I.R.C. § 7203, and proof of each element 
beyond a reasonable doubt, Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider Trading, and 
Problems of Proof, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (1991), so the standard in Harris for the Government 
to meet was fairly high.  In civil cases, taxpayers who display “willful neglect” in not filing returns can 
be liable for paying back taxes.  I.R.C. § 6651(a). 
14  Harris, 942 F.2d at 1131. 
15  Id. at 1132. 
16  A mistress is defined as “a woman other than his wife with whom a married man has a continuing 
sexual relationship.”  Mistress Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/mistress (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).  This Comment uses a slightly expanded definition of 
“mistress.”  Instead of examining only extramarital relationships (those in which at least one partner is 
married to someone else), this Comment addresses all nonmarital, noncohabitating relationships (both 
those relationships in which one or both partners is married to someone else and those relationships in 
which neither party is married).  This broadened definition encompasses all of the Tax Court cases dis-
cussed in this Comment in which a woman petitioning the court refers to herself as a mistress.  See infra 
Part II.B. 
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income.  In their Tax Court hearings, the women all asserted that their lov-
ers made the transfers in question with altruistic generosity, rendering the 
transfers nontaxable gifts and thus not includable in gross income.  In all 
cases, the courts evaluated the women’s claims by trying to determine the 
dominant intent underlying the relationships.  As this Comment demon-
strates, efforts to determine a single dominant intent underlying long-term, 
informal relationships contain problems of information, valuation, and con-
sistency that expose courts’ inability to grapple with the intimate details of 
relationships undefined by law. 
To solve these problems, this Comment suggests a default rule for 
long-term, nonmarital relationships: all transfers should be treated as in-
come and thus taxable to the recipient unless the relationship is casual or 
the lovers exchange only token gifts.  Part I discusses the gift–income dis-
tinction and examines the current rule for distinguishing the two.  Part II 
examines the specific gift–income distinctions in Tax Court cases involving 
transfers made in the course of intimate, long-term relationships.  Part III 
analyzes the difficulty of trying to define social relationships in a legal con-
text.  Part IV recommends a “nonmarital income rule” to remedy issues in 
the current jurisprudence.  Part IV also discusses the expected benefits of 
such a rule and examines some of the policy considerations involved. 
At the outset, it is important to emphasize what this Comment does not 
address.  This Comment examines only heterosexual couples in which an 
economically advantaged man transferred property inter vivos to his female 
mistress.  This narrow focus does not imply that such transfers take place 
only in the context of heterosexual relationships or that economically ad-
vantaged women never make transfers to their lovers.  Rather, my limited 
concentration reflects the narrow focus of the case law: my research did not 
uncover a single case in which a court addressed the gift–income question 
in the context of a noncohabiting, nonheterosexual relationship.17 
Although this Comment only explores a narrow subset of cases, these 
decisions highlight a broader debate about the intersection of intimacy, eco-
nomics, and social policy.  In examining how judicial inquiries approach is-
sues of love, money, and morality, this Comment questions whether the law 
can and should make such investigations. 
I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN GIFTS AND INCOME 
A. The Gift Exclusion and Its Rationales 
The Code defines “gross income” somewhat circularly: “gross income 
means all income from whatever source derived.”18  In Commissioner v. 
 
17  I searched federal district court and circuit court cases in addition to Tax Court cases.  The gift–
income distinction arises only infrequently with inter vivos transfers and even less often in the context of 
nonmarital relationships. 
18  I.R.C. § 61(a). 
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Glenshaw Glass Co., the Supreme Court elaborated on the Code’s defini-
tion: income includes all “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, 
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”19  Together, the 
Code definition and its judicial gloss encompass almost every increase in 
wealth imaginable.  Income can be derived from almost any source, includ-
ing earned wages;20 exchanges of goods or services;21 profits from life in-
surance,22 pensions,23 and annuities;24 gains from business dealings;25 and 
profits from investments.26  Income can result from any legal activity as 
well as from any illegal activity—the government recognizes accessions to 
wealth arising from illegal drug sales, prostitution, and embezzlement as in-
come.27 
Section 102(a) of the Code provides one conspicuous exclusion from 
the broad conception of income: gifts.28  Even when a recipient has received 
an “undeniable” and “clearly realized” benefit over which she has “com-
plete dominion,” if that transfer is categorized as a “gift,” she need not in-
clude its value in her gross income or pay tax on it.29 
The gift exclusion has contradictory and occasionally confusing re-
sults.  For example, if my employer pays me $4000 per month, I must claim 
that $4000 as income and may be taxed on the amount.  However, if a 
friend motivated by pure generosity gives me $4000, the transfer is catego-
rized as a gift, which I do not have to include in my gross income and on 
which I will not pay tax.  In both cases, I have certainly experienced an 
“undeniable accession[] to wealth” that is “clearly realized” and over which 
I have “complete dominion.”30  From my perspective, the source of the 
 
19  348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
20  I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (“[c]ompensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and 
similar items”). 
21  E.g., id. § 61(a)(3) (“[g]ains derived from dealings in property”). 
22  Id. § 61(a)(10) (“[i]ncome from life insurance and endowment contracts”). 
23  Id. § 61(a)(11). 
24  Id. § 61(a)(9). 
25  Id. § 61(a)(2) (“[g]ross income derived from business”). 
26  Id. § 61(a)(4)–(7) (“interest,” “rents,” “royalties,” “dividends”). 
27  Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (2006) (“Illegal gains constitute gross income.”).  In 1913, the first mod-
ern income tax (enacted after the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment) restricted its definition of in-
come to only gains from “lawful business carried on for gain or profit.”  Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, Pub. 
L. No. 63-16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (emphasis added).  In 1916, Congress excluded the word “law-
ful” from the definition of income.  Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 
756, 757.  Courts have inferred from the exclusion of the word “lawful” that gains from unlawful activi-
ties are also includable in gross income.  See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961) (re-
ferring to the assumption that “unlawful, as well as lawful, gains are comprehended within the term 
‘gross income’” as “a well-established principle”). 
28  I.R.C. § 102(a) (“Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, 
devise, or inheritance.”). 
29  Recipients do, however, pay tax on income the gift generates.  Id. § 1015(a). 
30  Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
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money makes no difference to how I can squander, save, or share the 
$4000.  This fungibility renders the gift exclusion difficult to rationalize be-
cause the question inevitably arises: Why should gifts and income be 
treated differently when their objective value is exactly the same? 
That Congress has never expressed a policy reason for the exclusion31 
exacerbates the difficulty of answering this question and leaves commenta-
tors struggling to explain why gifts are treated differently from income.  
Most scholars who have considered the question have been unable to ex-
press a principled distinction between gifts and income—and have thus 
suggested that the distinction be abolished.32  They have called the distinc-
tion between gifts and income “arbitrary”33 and “irreconcilable with any in-
telligible, coherent scheme of values.”34  Moreover, the absence of a clear 
distinction between gifts and income “introduces serious administrative dif-
ficulties” by requiring taxpayers and tax authorities to distinguish between 
transfers that can look very much alike.35  As one tax scholar put it, “If it is 
impractical to graduate taxes according to the pleasure return from one’s 
 
31  Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 
25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1992).  A full discussion of the history of the gift exclusion exceeds the scope 
of this Comment, but a number of sources discuss the topic at length.  See, e.g., William A. Klein, An 
Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word “Gift,” 48 MINN. L. REV. 215, 229–46 
(1964); Kornhauser, supra, at 38–52.  See generally C. Lowell Harriss, Legislative History of Federal 
Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531 (1940) (detailing the legislative history of gift taxation). 
32  See, e.g., HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 135 (1938) (“[I]t is hard to defend 
exclusion of certain receipts merely because one has done nothing or given nothing in return.”); John C. 
Chommie, Payments to Employees: Gifts or Compensation for Services?, 31 TAXES 620, 628 (1953) 
(“The incongruity of a gift in the usual commercial setting may indicate that the gift concept is being 
overworked; that it should be restricted, in so far as possible, to the intra-family transaction.”); Joseph 
M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1177, 1182–88, 1211 (1978) (arguing that “[b]oth theoretical and practical considerations” require 
that gains from gifts be included in the donee’s income); Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 54 (“A new pro-
vision should be enacted stating that a gift, bequest, legacy, or devise is a realization event to the do-
nor/decedent and thus taxable to him.”). 
Douglas Kahn and Jeffrey Kahn rationalize the gift exception by suggesting that it is “consistent 
with income tax policy” insofar as the gift-giver “purchases the right to have the taxed income used by 
the taxpayer, or by someone else of the taxpayer’s choosing, to acquire and consume societal goods or 
services.”  Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts”—The Income Tax Definition 
and Treatment of Private and Charitable “Gifts” and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion 
of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 444 (2003).  They do not, however, offer a way to 
distinguish between gifts and income that courts can apply in any principled manner.  Id. at 478–79 (“If 
the donor’s primary motive is not to vicariously enjoy the donee’s consumption, but rather is to purchase 
an attitude from the donee, then the condition that justifies granting an exclusion is not present.”). 
33  SIMONS, supra note 32, at 56–57. 
34  Klein, supra note 31, at 263. 
35  SIMONS, supra note 32, at 135; see also id. at 134 (“Considerations of equity surely afford little 
ground for excluding (or including) particular receipts according to the intentions of second parties.  
Gifts are very much like earnings, and earnings are often quite like gifts.”). 
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earning activity, surely it is hard to defend exclusion of certain receipts 
merely because one has done nothing or given nothing in return.”36 
Other exceptions to the broad income rule exist.  Imputed income—
such as income obtained from self-supplied services or self-owned proper-
ty37—is not included in gross income, although no specific Code provision 
excludes it.38  Also, most small transactions between family members are 
excluded.39  However, both of these exclusions have strong administrative 
justifications: both imputed income and intrafamilial transactions would be 
unwieldy to enforce and difficult to regulate.40  Transactions between family 
members are often called gifts to justify their exclusion, but there is little 
support for excluding gifts to nonfamily members. 
B. Applying the Gift–Income Distinction 
Regardless of the gift exclusion’s theoretical tenability, courts must 
apply the exclusion in practice—as a practical matter, they must determine 
which transfers are “gifts” and which are “income.”  Given that the exclu-
sion lacks a discernible underlying principle, courts’ income–gift distinc-
tions have understandably been inconsistent. 
Jurisprudence in the employment context has been especially fraught.  
In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, an employer had paid his em-
ployee’s taxes; the employee claimed that this discharge of his debt to the 
IRS was a gift and not taxable income.41  The Court determined that this 
transfer could not be a gift because the employer had received a benefit in 
the form of services from the employee.42  Thus the transfer was effectively 
a payment for services rendered.43  However, in Bogardus v. Commissioner, 
an employee’s bonus was a gift (and therefore nontaxable) because, in giv-
ing the bonus, the employer had been “inspired by gratitude for . . . past 
faithful service.”44  Although both Old Colony and Bogardus made it clear 
 
36  Id. at 135. 
37  Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 79 (1990) (“Imputed income may 
be defined as the benefits to the individual from (1) self-performed services and leisure, and (2) the use 
of consumer durable goods, including housing, owned by him.”). 
38  Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1576 (1996) (“Gains obtained in the 
formal, informal, and illegal markets are all taxable, while the economic benefits received from self-
supplied services or services from a family member are exempt from taxation.”). 
39  Id. 
40  See Thomas Chancellor, Imputed Income and the Ideal Income Tax, 67 OR. L. REV. 561, 561–62 
(1988) (noting that the “traditional view” explaining the exclusion of such gains from income rests on 
the impracticality of taxing such gains). 
41  279 U.S. 716, 720 (1929). 
42  Id. at 729. 
43  Id. (“The taxes were paid upon a valuable consideration, namely, the services rendered by the 
employee and as part of the compensation therefor.  We think, therefore, that the payment constituted 
income to the employee.”). 
44  302 U.S. 34, 44 (1937). 
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that the distinction between gifts and income was based on the motivation 
of the donor, neither case explained how courts could distinguish between 
payments for services and gifts inspired by gratitude.45 
In Commissioner v. Duberstein, the Supreme Court attempted to articu-
late a clear standard distinguishing income from gifts.46  A business owner 
had given a Cadillac to a contact who had provided useful information.47  
The IRS claimed that the value of the Cadillac constituted income taxable 
to the recipient.48  The recipient of the Cadillac contended that the car was a 
gift and therefore nontaxable.49  In determining that the Cadillac was in-
come to the recipient, the Court described the proper approach to distin-
guishing between income and gifts as “one that inquires what the basic 
reason for [the donor’s] conduct was in fact—the dominant reason that ex-
plains his action in making the transfer.”50  If the donor’s payment arose 
primarily from “detached and disinterested generosity”51 and proceeded 
“out of affection, respect, admiration, charity, or like impulses,” the transfer 
was a gift.52  But if a payment stemmed “primarily from ‘the constraining 
force of any moral or legal duty,’ or from ‘the incentive of anticipated bene-
fit’ of an economic nature,” the transfer was not a gift and was therefore 
taxable as income to the recipient.53  Determining a donor’s dominant intent 
was a facts-and-circumstances test that allowed the factfinder broad discre-
tion.54 
The Duberstein Court rejected a test suggested by the Government that 
would have categorically denied gift status to most transfers made in the 
business context.55  The Government argued that, in business situations, “it 
doubtless is, statistically speaking, the exceptional payment by an employer 
to an employee that amounts to a gift.”56  Although the Court agreed with 
that proposition, it refused to create a categorical exception to gift status in 
 
45  In response to the ambiguity surrounding the status of corporate transfers to employees, lower 
courts tried to develop objective criteria for finding the donor’s “inspiration.”  Courts looked at the way 
formal corporate resolutions described the transfer, whether the payor had deducted the transfer, whether 
the payment was calculated in reference to salary, and whether the shareholders had ratified the transfer.  
See Brief for the Petitioner at 11 n.6, Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) (No. 376); Chommie, 
supra note 32, at 622–24; Klein, supra note 31, at 222 & n.35. 
46  363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
47  Id. at 280. 
48  Id. at 281. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 286. 
51  Id. at 285 (quoting Comm’r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
52  Id. (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
53  Id. (quoting Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 34, 41, 58 (1937)). 
54  Id. at 288–89. 
55  Id. at 287 (“[Such] inferences cannot be stated in absolute terms.”). 
56  Id. 
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the commercial realm, preferring to leave such decisions to Congress.57  In 
the meantime, it was the factfinder’s responsibility to determine whether a 
transfer was primarily motivated by affection (“detached and disinterested 
generosity”) or self-interest (“anticipated benefit of an economic nature”).58 
The Court understood that many transfers have elements of both affec-
tion and self-interest.59  But the Court also assumed that, given enough evi-
dence, the factfinder would be able to determine which motivation 
predominated.  This assumption seems plausible in the business context—
businesses keep records of board meetings and memorialize their business 
transfers in writing, both of which could provide relevant information to the 
factfinder about the transferor’s underlying intent.  In practice, however, the 
determination proved far more difficult than the Duberstein Court foresaw, 
and courts’ outcomes were divided.  The Tax Court generally found that 
transfers to employees (or to employees’ surviving spouses) constituted 
taxable income, whereas district courts almost always found that these 
transfers could be “excluded from income as gifts.”60  Finally, in 1986, 
 
57  Id. at 290. 
58  Id. at 285 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Some contemporary scholars strongly 
criticized the Duberstein standard.  See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court 1959 Term—
Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes—Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 90 (1960) 
(“Is this not an example of an undue and unfortunate yielding of responsibility to juries and other triers 
of the facts, when what was called for was some clarification of the law applicable in cases of this 
sort?”); Klein, supra note 31, at 217 (“[T]he opinion did little, if anything, to narrow the ambiguity that 
in earlier cases had proved to be inherent in the word ‘intention.’”).  The Duberstein Court appeared to 
recognize that the standard it presented was not the most lucid: “This conclusion may not satisfy an aca-
demic desire for tidiness, symmetry and precision in this area, any more than a system based on the de-
terminations of various fact-finders ordinarily does.”  Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 290.  As applied in the 
context of business relationships, see infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text, and mistress relation-
ships, see infra Part II.B, the standard has not provided any “tidiness,” “symmetry,” or “precision.” 
59  This insight is not unique to the Court—a large literature on gifts and exchanges questions the 
distinction and asks whether it is possible to give anything disinterestedly.  See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, 
EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 88–114 (1964) (“People’s positive sentiments toward and eval-
uations of others, such as affection, approval, and respect, are rewards worth a price that enter into ex-
change transactions, but they must not be explicitly bartered in exchange lest their value as genuine 
feelings or judgments be compromised.”); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR 
EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 3 (W.D. Halls trans., 1990) (“[E]xchanges and contracts take place 
in the form of presents; in theory these are voluntary; in reality they are given and reciprocated obligato-
rily.”); Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 157 (1989) (“In light of . . . histori-
cal, comparative and social scientific evidence, the presumed dichotomy between gifts and bargains is 
difficult to sustain.”); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Be-
come Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 296 (1992) (describing “the 
ways in which the seemingly pure gift and the seemingly pure exchange melt together—patterns in 
which the unilateral aspects of gift transfers blur into the reciprocal aspects of exchange transfers, and 
vice versa”); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora’s Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815, 
819 (1999) (“[E]goism complements altruism as an equally true and necessary moment of human na-
ture.”). 
60  Kahn & Kahn, supra note 32, at 447 n.32.  Disagreements in tax law interpretation and applica-
tion tend to multiply given that numerous trial courts hear petitions from taxpayers who contest tax deci-
sions.  A taxpayer who contests an IRS assessment before paying the disputed tax can either file in the 
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Congress enacted § 102(c) of the Code, which explicitly denies gift status to 
“any amount transferred by or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an 
employee.”61  In so doing, Congress essentially adopted the rule that the 
Government had proposed in Duberstein: In the business context, all trans-
fers count as income.62 
Although Congress has resolved the question of primary donative in-
tent in business cases by categorically excluding business transfers from 
gift treatment, the dilemma remains in other contexts.  The next Part dis-
cusses how factfinders have fared in identifying a dominant intent in one 
particularly thorny area: transfers from lovers to their mistresses. 
II. ACCOUNTING FOR LOVE: GIFTS AND INCOME IN THE MISTRESS CASES 
A. An Introduction to the Mistress Cases 
Before addressing the question of intent in transfers to mistresses, it is 
worth briefly describing the category of cases this Comment considers un-
der the moniker “the mistress cases.”  The mistress cases concern eight peti-
tions heard by the Tax Court from 1955 through 1992.63  Although the 
cases’ details differed, they shared similar underlying structures and fea-
tures.  This section proceeds by describing how these cases came to the Tax 
Court, what procedures the Tax Court followed, and what types of tax is-
sues the cases raised. 
The mistress cases all began as most tax disputes do: the IRS audited 
the taxpayer’s returns64 or noted that she had failed to file returns altogether.  
 
Tax Court, I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2006), or raise the issue in a Bankruptcy Court proceeding, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 505(a) (2006).  See Thomas D. Greenaway, Choice of Forum in Federal Civil Tax Litigation, 62 TAX 
LAW. 311, 312 (2009).  A taxpayer who requests a refund can raise the claim in the Tax Court, I.R.C. 
§ 6512(b); in a U.S. district court, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1346(a)(1) (2006); in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
5 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2006); or in the Court of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1491.  See Greenaway, supra.  
A primary source of disuniformity in tax law arises from the appellate process.  Tax Court decisions can 
be appealed to federal circuit courts, but the Tax Court need not—and often does not—follow circuit 
precedent.  See Susan Striz, Note, The Key to Closing the Tax Gap: Understanding, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 
1053, 1085–86 (2010). 
61  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 122(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2110 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 102(c) (2006)). 
62  Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 45. 
63  Toms v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 92,125 (1992); Austin v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 85,022 
(1985); Jones v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 77,329 (1977); Reis v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 74,287 
(1974); Libby v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 69,184 (1969); Starks v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 66,134 
(1966); Brizendine v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 57,032 (1957); Blevins v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) 
¶ 55,211 (1955), aff’d, 238 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1956). 
64  The IRS chooses to audit an individual return in three different ways: random selection, special 
projects, and computerized scoring.  Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertain-
ty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1068–69 (2009).  Special projects concern IRS decisions to focus on tax 
returns with specific characteristics.  Id.  Computerized scoring involves the Differential Index Function, 
a method whose criteria and cutoffs are known only to the IRS.  Id.  Because no one knows how the IRS 
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During the audit or in the process of investigating a failure to file, the inves-
tigator noticed a deficiency—an understatement of income and a corres-
ponding underpayment of income tax.  The IRS then sent the woman a 
notice of deficiency.  Without paying the amount the IRS had determined 
she owed, the woman filed a petition with the Tax Court contesting the 
IRS’s assessment.65 
The method the IRS used to determine deficiencies in these cases in-
formed the issues the women raised in their petitions.  Each woman peti-
tioning the Tax Court in the mistress cases had kept insufficient records of 
her income and had either neglected to file tax returns or filed returns that 
insufficiently described her economic activity.  To determine the existence 
and amount of deficiency, the IRS had to reconstruct the woman’s income 
for the years in question. 
In the mistress cases, this daunting task was accomplished through 
some variety of the “cash accrual” method.66  This method requires the IRS 
to determine the value of the assets a woman had at the beginning of the 
year of underpayment by investigating her bank records, valuing her home, 
and determining how much cash she had on hand.  From this number the 
IRS subtracts liabilities, such as the amount the woman paid on loans and 
mortgages.  The IRS then determines her net worth at the end of the year of 
underpayment and (if possible) the amount of any expenditures, including 
living expenses, she made during the year.  Finally, the IRS calculates how 
much the amount of money she gained during the year, measured by ex-
penditures and assets minus liabilities, differs from the income she claimed 
for that year.  The difference between these two numbers provides her net 
unclaimed income for the year: 
(Expenditures + ending net worth) – (starting net worth + claimed income + 
liabilities) = amount of unclaimed income 
The amount the taxpayer should have paid on the unclaimed income 
equals her deficiency.67  The IRS can add penalties to this amount that vary 
 
chooses which returns to audit, it is possible that there is a selection bias present in these cases that is 
indiscernible to outsiders. 
65  For an explanation of the process of filing tax claims, see supra note 60. 
66  This method is explained only briefly here.  For a detailed explanation, see Holland v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 121, 125, 131 (1954).  This method is also called the “net worth” method.  Id. 
67  As a concrete example, consider the method as executed in Blevins, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 55,211, at 
704.  Blevins had not filed returns for the years 1940 to 1951, so the IRS had to calculate her net income 
for each separate year in order to determine how much tax she owed.  Id. at 703.  The IRS calculated her 
net income for 1940 as follows.  First, the government calculated Blevins’s assets by adding together the 
value of her government bonds, the value of the home that she owned, the amount of cash she kept in 
her safe deposit box, and the amount of money in her savings account, for a total of $2075.  The IRS 
subtracted from that number Blevins’s liabilities for that year ($498.83 for her mortgage payment) for an 
end-of-year net worth of $1576.17.  Id. at 704.  The IRS then took the net worth it had determined she 
had at the beginning of the year ($1300.82) and figured out that during 1940 her net worth had increased 
by $275.35 ($1576.17 – $1300.82).  The IRS then added her estimated living expenses, $2000, to this 
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according to the length of time the taxpayer neglected to pay and the tax-
payer’s intent to defraud the IRS.68 
When the IRS assesses deficiencies with this method, taxpayers invoke 
two main defenses.69  First, they claim that their net worth at the beginning 
of the time period exceeded the IRS estimate.  These taxpayers assert that 
they had a cash hoard—a large sum of cash that was unrecorded because 
the taxpayer kept it in an unofficial place, such as at home or in a safety de-
posit box.70  Second, taxpayers claim that the money they spent during the 
tax period came from a legal but nontaxable source, such as gifts.71  The 
eight women in the mistress cases all claimed that the discrepancy between 
 
number to determine that Blevins’s net income for that year was $2275.35.  Id.  (In assessing the accura-
cy of the IRS’s calculations, the Tax Court found that Blevins had had a small amount of extra income 
and adjusted the total accordingly, to $2287.32.  Id. at 705.)  The IRS then added the amount of Ble-
vins’s deficiency (the amount of tax she should have paid after subtracting deductions from her net in-
come), her penalty for not filing returns (according to the Code provision that is now I.R.C. § 6662 
(2006)), and a penalty for the fact that her failure to file was willful (now I.R.C. § 6651(f)): $54.90 + 
$13.73 + 27.45 = $96.08.  Blevins, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 55,211, at 704.  See infra note 68 for more informa-
tion about penalties. 
68  The Code provides a number of penalties for delinquent taxpayers.  The IRS is likely to penalize 
a taxpayer who underreports income, especially if she intended to defraud the IRS.  I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) 
(providing that, absent reasonable cause, a deficient taxpayer must pay 5% for each month that taxes are 
late, up to 25% of the amount of taxes due); id. § 6663(a) (providing that a taxpayer must pay a 75% pe-
nalty on amounts underreported due to fraud).  The IRS will assess similar penalties for a complete fail-
ure to file.  Id. § 6662 (providing that a taxpayer who substantially underreports income or underreports 
out of negligence must pay 20% on the underreported amount); id. § 6651(f) (providing that a taxpayer 
who fraudulently fails to file must pay 15% per month for every month the return is delinquent, up to a 
maximum of five months, or 75%). 
69  Jeffrey W. Loubet, Combating the Net Worth Method, 49 TAXES 54, 57 (1971) (“The number of 
defenses against [the net worth plus cash expenditures method] are extremely limited. . . .  [T]he taxpay-
er is limited to either demonstrating that there was a nontaxable source for the cash he spent, or relying 
upon the somewhat hackneyed ‘cash hoard’ explanation.”); Clyde R. Maxwell, Tax Evasion Cases—The 
Cash Hoard Defense, 50 L.A. B. BULL. 59, 59 (1974) (“The usual and principal defense urged by a tax-
payer against whom the Internal Revenue Service seeks to use [the net worth and cash expenditure] me-
thod is that the taxpayer had a cash hoard at or near the beginning of the first year for which he finds 
himself under investigation . . . .”). 
70  Holland, 348 U.S. at 127 (“Among the defenses often asserted is the taxpayer’s claim that the net 
worth increase shown by the Government’s statement is in reality not an increase at all because of the 
existence of substantial cash on hand at the starting point.”); Scot P. Gormley & Thomas M. Porcano, 
Reconstruction of Income by the Internal Revenue Service, TAXES, Apr. 1999, at 34, 41 (“[T]he taxpayer 
will claim that a portion of his or her assets represents nontaxable income that has been accumulated 
over a period of years.”); Marvin M. Levy, The Net Worth Question: Defending Against the IRS’s Potent 
Investigative Weapon, 4 WASH. LAW., July/Aug. 1990, at 40, 41 (“The defense that a large amount of 
currency existed, outside the bank, is the ‘cash hoard defense.’”). 
71  See Holland, 348 U.S. at 127 (“It may be that gifts, inheritances, loans and the like account for 
the newly acquired wealth.”); Pamela H. Bucy, Criminal Tax Fraud: The Downfall of Murderers, Ma-
dams and Thieves, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 666 (1997) (“In some net worth cases, the defense actively 
seeks to prove that the increase in net worth is due to nontaxable sources such as gifts or loans.”). 
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their expenditures and their net worth came from a nontaxable source: gifts 
from lovers.72 
In accordance with the donor’s intent test from Duberstein,73 judges in 
the mistress cases attempted to assess the motivations behind the transfers 
from paramour to mistress.  If the relationship had been primarily one of 
love and affection, the transfers would be nontaxable gifts.  But if the trans-
fers had been payments for the mistress’s services, the gains would be con-
sidered part of her income. 
As the Duberstein Court pointed out, the gift–income distinction is 
fact-intensive and puts a great deal of responsibility on the factfinder.74  The 
Tax Court is an Article I court, which means that no jury trial right attaches 
to civil cases conducted there.75  Thus, the Tax Court judges deciding the 
mistress cases functioned as factfinders; they considered the petition and 
the results of the IRS investigation, held a trial so the parties could present 
their cases and witnesses, and made decisions based on their assessments of 
the facts.  As a closer look at these cases demonstrates, Tax Court judges 
were unable to distinguish between gifts and income with any clarity, pri-
marily because the donor’s intent test presents insurmountable obstacles in 
cases involving long-term, nonmarital relationships. 
B. For Love or Money: The Tax Court’s Decisions 
Because the distinction between taxable income and nontaxable gifts 
turns on the donor’s intent,76 the mistress cases pinpoint the question of 
proving intent in long-term relationships that are often kept from public 
view.  Because intent requires a facts-and-circumstances determination, the 
judges had to parse the evidence carefully.  When the evidence proved in-
conclusive, the judges relied on their “experience with the mainsprings of 
human conduct.”77  In the sections below, I discuss the evidentiary issues 
that confronted the judges in the mistress cases and the assumptions about 
 
72  The cases considered here only include inter vivos transfers.  There are also a number of cases in 
which mistresses won suits against or settled with their deceased lovers’ estates, claiming that they had 
exchanged companionship for a promise of bequest.  See, e.g., Braddock v. United States, 434 F.2d 631 
(9th Cir. 1970); Roberts v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 95,171 (1995); Green v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) 
¶ 87,503 (1987); Cotnam v. Comm’r, 28 T.C. 947 (1957).  The IRS later determined a deficiency in 
these women’s income tax reporting.  The women (or their estates) then claimed that the settlement or 
verdict amount constituted gifts from a lover, not taxable income.  This Comment does not consider 
these cases because the courts’ determinations of the gift–income question were often constrained by the 
terms of the verdict or settlement agreement—a fact that limited their ability to pursue the donor’s intent 
standard that this Comment addresses. 
73  363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960); see supra notes 47–57 and accompanying text. 
74  See supra text accompanying notes 53–58. 
75  See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline 
Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 207. 
76  Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285–86; see supra notes 46–66 and accompanying text. 
77  Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 289. 
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human conduct that informed the cases’ outcomes.  Section 1 describes the 
scarcity of documentary evidence in the mistress cases.  Section 2 explores 
the particular unreliability of witness testimony in these cases.  Section 3 
discusses the problematic distinction between services and affection that the 
judges made.  Section 4 assesses the difficulty of valuing companionship 
that confronted these decisionmakers. 
1. A Dearth of Documentary Evidence.—Lovers do not make good 
bookkeepers, or so the mistress cases imply.  In all of the mistress cases, the 
mistresses themselves had kept insufficient records, which forced the IRS to 
assess the women’s deficiencies by reconstructing their incomes.78  The 
secrecy of these relationships probably explains the lack of documentary 
evidence: usually either one or both of the lovers were married to someone 
else at the time the contested transfers took place.  Thus the lovers usually 
went to great lengths to avoid detection, in part by avoiding creating a paper 
trail.  For example, in Libby v. Commissioner, a lover had tried to hide the 
payments to his mistress from his wife by lying to the IRS about the amount 
of the transfers and convincing the mistress to open a checking account un-
der the name of a nonexistent business entity.79  Toms v. Commissioner con-
cerned a woman who kept records of the payments she had received in a 
code that the IRS could not decipher.80  A number of lovers made payments 
to their mistresses in cash, presumably to avoid detection.81 
Although several of the mistress case judges suggested that the fre-
quency and regularity of payments indicated that the transfers were com-
pensation for services,82 financial records were generally of little help in 
determining intent.  Moreover, none of the decisionmakers could rely on the 
kinds of documents that might be helpful in assessing the motivation under-
lying the transfers: throughout the cases, neither party introduced a single 
love letter or other declaration.  In short, the judges had very little docu-
mentary evidence with which to analyze the donors’ intentions. 
2. The Lovers’ Testimony.—Without much documentary evidence to 
rely on, the judges in the mistress cases usually had to consider the testimo-
ny of any parties involved.  However, the problem of secrecy presented it-
self here too: in relationships that were clandestine and usually informal, 
only the lovers themselves were competent to testify about the relation-
ships’ qualities.83  But the judges tended to find those witnesses unreliable. 
 
78  See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text for a description of the net worth method. 
79  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 69,184, at 989 (1969). 
80  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 92,125, at 581 (1992). 
81  See, e.g., Reis v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 74,287, at 1259 (1974); Starks v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-
H) ¶ 66,134, at 764–65 (1966). 
82  See infra Part II.B.3–4. 
83  E.g., Starks, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 66,134, at 765. 
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When mistresses testified, they provided detailed descriptions of their 
relationships with their paramours to demonstrate that love—not money—
prompted those liaisons.  If they could convince the judges that the discre-
pancies between their claimed income and the gains the IRS had determined 
were attributable to gifts from their paramours, the mistresses would not 
pay tax on the value of those gifts.  Given that their characterizations of 
their relationships with their lovers had direct tax consequences, mistresses 
were highly motivated to emphasize the affectionate qualities and to deem-
phasize the transactional aspects of their relationships.  Such self-serving 
testimony rarely sufficed to convince the judges.84 
The mistresses’ paramours proved even less reliable.  For example, 
Starks v. Commissioner involved the petition of a woman who had received 
living expenses, a house, furniture, a car, jewelry, and clothing from one 
man over a period of five years.85  The IRS called the value of these trans-
fers “income . . . ‘for services rendered’” and argued that the woman owed 
unpaid self-employment tax on the gain; she argued that the transfers had 
been nontaxable gifts motivated by affection.86  When the donor was called 
to the stand, he explained that “the purpose of the payments” was “[t]o in-
sure the companionship of Greta Starks, more or less of a personal invest-
ment in the future on my part.”87  Did the lover’s testimony shed any light 
on the question of the purpose underlying the transfers?  The court thought 
not; it found the lover’s statements “incomprehensive and rather absurd as 
statements of purpose.”88  The court did not provide any direction about 
what it might have considered a valid purpose. 
In fact, in almost every case in which a lover testified, the judge found 
him not credible.  In Jones v. Commissioner, the judge described the lover’s 
testimony as “evasive” and “contradictory.”89  The Toms v. Commissioner 
judge dismissed the paramour as “unpersuasive.”90  Based on the facts in 
Blevins v. Commissioner, the court simply assumed that the paramour was 
lying.91  In Libby v. Commissioner, the one case in which the judge found 
the lover’s testimony at least somewhat believable, the judge’s response to 
the testimony was still lukewarm: he found the lover’s testimony “obscure 
 
84  See, e.g., Libby, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 69,184, at 997 (characterizing the mistress’s testimony as “va-
gue, self-serving, inconsistent, exaggerated and somewhat incredible”); Blevins v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-
H) ¶ 55,211, at 705 (1955) (describing the mistress’s testimony as “uncorroborated” and “self-serving”), 
aff’d, 238 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1956). 
85  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 66,134, at 764–65. 
86  Id. at 765. 
87  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
88  Id. at 766. 
89  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 77,329, at 1323 (1977). 
90  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 92,125, at 579 (1992). 
91  See T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 55,211, at 706 (1955), aff’d, 238 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1956). 
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and in conflict with what he told the special agent during the [IRS] investi-
gation.”92 
In some cases, the lover’s unreliable testimony was not even available 
because the lover had died or the IRS could not locate him.93  In Reis v. 
Commissioner, the IRS found that a nightclub singer had underreported her 
income for six years.94  The woman claimed that at the beginning of the 
time period she had over $100,000 in cash, most of which she had received 
as gifts from a lover.95  The lover, however, was nowhere to be found.96  
The relationship between the two had ended almost fifteen years before the 
woman petitioned the Tax Court, and the two had long since lost touch.  
Without any evidence other than the woman’s testimony, the court some-
what grudgingly allowed the woman’s gift claim to stand.97 
3. Sex for Sale.—Without evidence demonstrating intent, the judges 
in the mistress cases had to base their decisions on proxies for intent: fac-
tors that did not directly demonstrate intent but could be used to infer it.  
The courts relied most often on a proxy that might be called market beha-
vior: whether the couple behaved more like rational actors making an im-
personal exchange or more like actors whose behavior could only be 
explained by personal interests and affections.  The most reliable indicator 
of market behavior in the mistress cases was the woman’s former prostitu-
tion: if a woman had any prostitution in her past, the judge presumed that 
the relationship at issue was motivated primarily by self-interest and that 
the transfers made in the context of the relationship were payments for ser-
vices.98 
 
92  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 69,184, at 997 (1969). 
93  See, e.g., Austin v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 85,022, at 103 (1985) (lover had died); Reis v. 
Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 74,287, at 1265 (1974) (lover could not be located). 
94  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 74,287, at 1258. 
95  Id. at 1263. 
96  Id. at 1264. 
97  Id. at 1265. 
98  This is similar to the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in United States v. Harris: “If these cases 
make a rule of law, it is that a person is entitled to treat cash and property received from a lover as gifts, 
as long as the relationship consists of something more than specific payments for specific sessions of 
sex.”  942 F.2d 1125, 1133–34 (7th Cir. 1991). 
The rule makes sense insofar as the proceeds from illegal prostitution constitute income and are tax-
able to the recipient.  In United States v. Tunnell, the Fifth Circuit explicitly stated that income from il-
legal prostitution falls under the Code’s definition of gross income.  481 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1973).  
Even before Tunnell, “It had been a well-established principle . . . that unlawful, as well as lawful, gains 
are comprehended within the term ‘gross income.’”  James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961); 
see also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (2006) (“Illegal gains constitute gross income.”). 
Legal prostitution is also taxed, even though some detractors object to taxation, arguing that taxation 
confers legitimacy on a morally corrupt industry.  See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 
88 N.C. L. REV. 1740, 1754 (2010) (noting the “unwillingness to provide a stamp of government ap-
proval to Nevada’s brothel industry”).  The legal brothels in Nevada have lobbied extensively to be 
taxed by the state, hoping that taxation will signal state approval of a morally condemned legal business.  
105:1739  (2011) Gift Exclusion in Nonmarital Relationships 
 1755
This sounds like a straightforward rule, and in some cases it probably 
functioned as an accurate proxy for intent.  Consider, for example, Toms v. 
Commissioner,99 a case in which the relationships between a woman and her 
paramours were almost certainly just business.  Toms owned and operated a 
“freelance escort service and a house of prostitution” for three years.100  She 
advertised for and hired prostitutes and solicited business in local newspa-
pers.101  She also practiced prostitution herself and at one point advertised 
“for a millionaire who could financially support her.”102  This conspicuous 
illegal activity triggered an investigation by local law enforcement,103 and 
Toms pleaded guilty to prostitution in 1985.104  Three years later, she was 
convicted of willful tax evasion for failing to pay federal taxes on the 
proceeds from her illicit business.105 
Toms contested the amount of the tax and penalties the IRS claimed 
she owed, arguing that a substantial amount of what the IRS had calculated 
as income actually was gifted to her from lovers and thus should not have 
been included in the IRS’s assessment of her unreported income.106  How-
ever, her criminal history and the fact that she was paid every time she saw 
these men undermined the credibility of her claims.107  The court had little 
difficulty determining that the transfers “were payments for services, not 
gifts” and therefore were taxable income to Toms.108 
However, the prostitution-as-proxy approach was not always reliable in 
the mistress cases, primarily because a woman’s past behavior did not nec-
essarily extend to the relationship the Tax Court was examining.  In Jones 
v. Commissioner, for example, the petitioner admitted to both the FBI and 
the IRS that she had worked as a prostitute.109  The court thus determined 
that the transfers from her lover could not constitute gifts—they were clear-
 
Kathleen Hennessy, Brothels Want To Be Taxed; Legislature Not that Greedy: Proprietors Believe Pay-
ing Taxes Would Lend Legitimacy to Houses of Prostitution, PAHRUMP VALLEY TIMES, May 13, 2005, 
at A20, available at http://www.pahrumpvalleytimes.com/2005/05/13/news/brothels.html; see also 
Krawiec, supra, at 1743 (noting the perceived benefits from imposing a tax on legal Nevada brothels).  
99  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 92,125 (1992). 
100  Id. at 571. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. at 572. 
104  Id. at 571. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. at 570. 
107  Id. at 579 (“Mr. Cohen paid petitioner for the first evening she spent with him and paid her most 
nights she saw him.  This suggests a paid escort relationship, not gifts to a friend.”); id. (“[Mr. DeFelice] 
began seeing [Toms] twice a week in May 1982 and three to four times a week in 1983.  Each week he 
paid her.  We find that the payments were for services rendered, not gifts.”). 
108  Id. at 580. 
109  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 77,329, at 1323 (1977).  The court’s opinion does not reveal why Jones had been 
talking with the FBI. 
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ly payments for services.110  However, the relationship at issue seemed more 
complex than the court assumed: the woman’s paramour had also given her 
a legitimate job, the couple went on dates, and the relationship had lasted 
for a number of years.111  Although the woman had been a prostitute at some 
point, it was not clear that this was a business relationship.  Similarly, in 
Brizendine v. Commissioner, a woman’s five convictions for prostitution 
(all before the time period when the deficiency was assessed) were decisive 
factors in the court’s determination that a lover’s weekly financial support 
could not be gifts to the woman—even though the lover had supported the 
woman financially on the condition that she stop practicing prostitution.112 
The prostitution-as-proxy-for-intent approach in the mistress cases led 
to some incongruous results: judges found gifts in some circumstances and 
income in others, even when the behaviors in the two cases were almost in-
distinguishable.  Compare, for example, the cases of Thelma Blevins and 
Lillian Reis.  Blevins operated a “house of prostitution,” “staged immoral 
shows,” furnished call girls to local hotels, and personally practiced prosti-
tution.113  The IRS claimed that Blevins had underreported income over a 
period of eleven years;114 she contended that more than half of the money 
had come from “an admirer” and that the transfers were nontaxable gifts.115  
The court disagreed and found Blevins liable for all deficiencies assessed.116  
However, there was ample evidence that Blevins’s relationship with her 
lover had several characteristics demonstrating that it was far more than just 
business.  The relationship was long and ongoing—the lover had partially 
supported her for almost eleven years.117  He also demonstrated an interest 
in her life that went beyond the purely transactional.  He accompanied her 
 
110  Id. (“Certainly the funds which [the lover] gave to petitioner were not gifts within the meaning 
of the income tax statutes.  [He] gave this cash to petitioner because petitioner had sexual relations with 
him when he was in Atlanta.”). 
111  Id. at 1321. 
112  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 57,032, at 126 (1957).  The court’s reasoning in Brizendine was particularly 
convoluted.  The mistress met a man who offered to support her if she would stop practicing prostitu-
tion. She accepted his offer and stopped working as a prostitute.  Id.  The court found that her “promise 
constituted valid consideration for the payments which cause[d] them to be taxable as ordinary income.”  
Id. at 127.  In other words, a woman who agreed to stop practicing prostitution in exchange for support 
was practicing prostitution by making the agreement. 
113  Blevins v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 55,211, at 705 (1955), aff’d, 238 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1956).  
It is unclear how the court knew about Blevins’s illegal activities.  There was no evidence of a criminal 
case against Blevins for exchanging sex for money, nor did this case involve tax deficiencies for unre-
ported business income.  Blevins did not contest the court’s characterization of her as a prostitute, so it is 
possible that she stipulated that fact for reasons unclear. 
114  Id. at 703. 
115  Id. at 706. 
116  Id. 
117  Mulhall gave Blevins $1500 in 1941 and $2500 every year thereafter.  Id. at 705.  It seems that 
these transfers covered the bulk of Blevins’s living expenses: the Commissioner found that Blevins’s 
living expenses totaled $2000 per year.  Id. at 706. 
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to the IRS office when she received a notice of deficiency and visited her 
son in the hospital when he was injured. 
In contrast, Lillian Reis’s relationship with her paramour had begun 
with money: on first seeing her perform at a nightclub, an admirer offered 
to write her a check for any gift she would like.118  When the check cleared, 
Reis and the man began a relationship.  During the course of their relation-
ship, the couple had regularly scheduled liaisons—they met twice weekly, 
and he paid her each week.119  Reis herself characterized the relationship as 
transactional, claiming that she had “earned every penny” of the payments 
she received from him.120 
The judge determined the transfers had been gifts: “[W]e find that 
there was sufficient donative intent and no expectation of a quid pro quo.”121  
In a footnote, the court distinguished Blevins without explanation.122  Ble-
vins had certainly conducted relationships in which she exchanged compa-
nionship for money.  But Reis, too, had undertaken a series of relationships 
in which men had given her money in exchange for her companionship.123  
And while Reis’s regular dates with her lover may have signaled a romantic 
relationship, they just as easily could have implied some sort of economic 
exchange as well.124  Thus, what sounds like a relatively simple test—
transfers from a lover become taxable income if sex is exchanged for mon-
ey—proved nearly impossible to apply in the factual complexity of the mi-
stress cases. 
4. Valuing Companionship.—If a woman at some point placed her 
sexual services on the market, the Tax Court assumed that the relationship 
in question was motivated by self-interest—it used prostitution as a proxy 
for intent.  The mistress cases also demonstrate that the Tax Court used be-
havior that seemed economically irrational as a proxy for love.  In other 
words, if the transfers demonstrated behavior that would not make sense in 
a market exchange, the court assumed that the transfers were made with 
donative intent and were thus nontaxable gifts. 
 
118  Reis v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 74,287, at 1259 (1974).  Reis asked the man for $2400 for two 
mink stoles—one for herself and one for her sister.  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. at 1265 n.11.  Recall that Reis’s descriptions of the relationship had little effect on the court’s 
determination because the Duberstein test concerns the donor’s intent, not the donee’s. 
121  Id. at 1265. 
122  Id. at 1265 n.11. 
123  Id. at 1259 (“She had accumulated approximately $12,000 in cash by this time.  This accumula-
tion resulted primarily from gifts from a certain gentleman friend in Florida.”); id. (noting that, after one 
lover went to jail for passing bad checks, a new lover “started paying all of [Reis’s] living expenses”). 
124  Id. at 1265 n.11 (“In making this finding we have considered the remarks in [Blevins].  We have 
also considered the fact that petitioner met Mr. Miller on a regular basis . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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For example, in Starks v. Commissioner, Greta Starks had conducted a 
relationship with an older married man for five years.125  For four of those 
years, his transfers to her (in the form of purchases and living expenses) had 
averaged just under $6000 per year.  During one of the five years, however, 
the value of the lover’s transfers to Starks had been much higher.  In that 
year, the lover had put a down payment on a house for Starks, bought her 
furs, taken her shopping at Saks, purchased a piano and furniture, and pro-
vided a weekly allowance—all for a grand total of over $41,000.126  The 
IRS called the transfers for all five years “assets received for services ren-
dered,”127 claiming that “‘[c]ompanionship’ was the service sought by [the 
lover] and ‘companionship’ is the service that he received.  In exchange for 
this service, [the lover] housed, clothed and fed the petitioner.”128  The Gov-
ernment concluded that, “[c]ertainly, the ‘companionship’ of the petitioner 
constituted ‘services rendered.’”129 
The court found this characterization ludicrous.  Companionship could 
not be a service because typical prices for services did not vary that radical-
ly: “Evidently [the IRS] would argue the man paid her over $41,000 for her 
companionship in 1955 and $5,000 or $6,000 for her companionship in the 
other years.”130  The court did not indicate how it would have decided if the 
payments had been more regular—if the lover had given Starks the same 
amount of money each year—but the court certainly implied that payments 
for services can be distinguished from gifts because the former have a more 
stable market price. 
Austin v. Commissioner131 presents another example of the Tax Court 
distinguishing between gifts and income by assuming that irrational market 
behavior functions as a proxy for love.  Austin and a married man con-
ducted a relationship for the two years leading up to the man’s death.132  Af-
ter his death, she sued his estate for several million dollars, claiming that he 
had promised to leave her half of his estate.133  She settled for $42,500, 
which the settlement agreement characterized as payment for “various ser-
vices.”134 
A few years later, the IRS mailed notices of deficiency to Austin, 
claiming that she had underreported her income from the two years of her 
 
125  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 66,134, at 764–65 (1966); see supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
126  Starks, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 66,134, at 765–66. 
127  Id. at 765. 
128  Id. at 766 n.1. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. at 766. 
131  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 85,022 (1985). 
132  Id. at 100–01. 
133  Id. at 101. 
134  Id. at 102. 
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relationship with her lover.135  In the first year, Austin’s paramour had 
bought her a house and given her regular checks, amounting to a total gain 
of almost $48,000.136  In the second year, he had given her regular checks 
totaling $9214.137  In her petition, Austin claimed that all of this money con-
stituted gifts and that she had thus properly excluded these amounts from 
her tax returns; the IRS, of course, argued that these amounts were pay-
ments for services rendered.138 
The court conceded that the $42,500 settlement amount was payment 
for services because the settlement agreement explicitly termed it as such.139  
The court could not believe, however, that all of the transfers from the lover 
to Austin constituted compensation: “In order to hold for [the IRS] . . . we 
would have to conclude that [the lover] paid petitioner $47,704 for her 1972 
services to him and $9,214 for her 1973 services to him . . . and that peti-
tioner nevertheless had been undercompensated by $42,500 [the amount of 
the settlement] for these services.”140  The court assumed that to pay Austin 
almost $100,000 for less than two years of companionship “services” would 
be to seriously overvalue that companionship.141  In other words, paying so 
much for companionship was irrational.  Because the transfers were irra-
tional, they had to be gifts. 
The court most clearly stated its rationale for characterizing “irration-
al” transfers—those that varied without explanation (as in Starks) and those 
that overvalued companionship (as in Austin)—as gifts in Libby v. Commis-
sioner.142  Virginia Libby and her husband had understated their income for 
six consecutive years, but Virginia claimed that a substantial amount of the 
money had come from a lover.143  The court characterized both Virginia and 
her lover as financially savvy about bookkeeping, investing, and evading 
tax responsibilities.144  Nonetheless, the court accepted that the lover’s trans-
fers to Virginia were gifts in the amounts that she claimed.  The court ex-
plained the couple’s failure to keep records of transfers in this realm of their 
lives (as opposed to all other realms of their lives) by asserting that people 
in love have better things to do than accounting: “[W]e are not too con-
 
135  Id. at 103. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. at 104. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 69,184, at 997 (1969). 
143  Id. at 996. 
144  The lover and Virginia had both displayed considerable dishonesty in other financial matters.  
See id. at 996–98.  Virginia herself was fairly financially savvy: much of the court’s opinion detailed her 
failure to accurately report sources of income and other fraudulent tax behavior.  Id. at 998 (“[D]espite 
the lack of formal education, Virginia was knowledgeable about her business and personal affairs, albeit 
with flexible scruples.”). 
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cerned [about the insufficient evidence] because there is little likelihood 
that [the couple was] interested in ‘keeping books on romance.’”145  In other 
words, romantic relationships exist in a realm separate from the public 
world of market exchange and rational valuation.  Some amount of irratio-
nality is accepted—and maybe even expected. 
 
 * * * 
 
The Tax Court’s mistress case decisions reveal that the intent assess-
ment at the center of the gift–income distinction is incredibly difficult to 
make when cases involve intimate relationships.  The opinions seem to ex-
emplify the fears that Justice Frankfurter expressed in his Duberstein dis-
sent.146  In disagreeing with the majority’s newly enunciated donor’s intent 
standard,147 Justice Frankfurter voiced concerns about the fact-heavy inquiry 
the standard required: 
What the Court now does sets fact-finding bodies to sail on an illimitable 
ocean of individual beliefs and experiences.  This can hardly fail to invite, if 
indeed not encourage, too individualized diversities in the administration of 
the income tax law.  I am afraid that by these new phrasings the practicalities 
of tax administration, which should be as uniform as is possible in so vast a 
country as ours, will be embarrassed.148 
The mistress cases exemplify the confusion that the donor’s intent standard 
can cause.  The next Part suggests that, in addition to the practical difficul-
ties accompanying the donor’s intent standard, the judicial assessment of in-
timate relationships presents normative problems. 
III. COMPARING CADILLACS TO COMPANIONSHIP 
Commissioner v. Duberstein provides a useful frame for the argument 
that courts should not make intent inquiries in cases concerning intimate re-
lationships.  In Duberstein, the Supreme Court assessed a transfer in which 
a man received a Cadillac from a business contact.149  The Court found that 
the Cadillac was income to the recipient because the transfer “was at bottom 
a recompense for Duberstein’s past services, or an inducement for him to be 
of further service in the future.”150  In the mistress cases, courts investigated 
the difference between a Cadillac and companionship—that is, they at-
tempted to articulate what distinguishes a voluntary transfer in the business 
context from a similar transfer in the context of a personal relationship.  
 
145  Id. at 997. 
146  See 363 U.S. 278, 294–98 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring and dissenting). 
147  See supra notes 41–54 and accompanying text. 
148  Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 297. 
149  Id. at 280 (majority opinion). 
150  Id. at 291–92. 
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This Part contends that there is no difference between the exchange in Du-
berstein and the exchanges in the mistress cases—not because a Cadillac 
and companionship are both equally alienable market commodities but be-
cause there is no way to get to the “bottom” of intimate relationships to de-
termine a dominant intent. 
The primary obstacle to the Tax Court’s determination of a donor’s 
dominant intent in the mistress cases was the dearth of evidence these rela-
tionships produced.151  In some ways this is unsurprising: we generally do 
not expect lovers to keep records of their transactions in the way we expect 
business professionals to.  These expectations are keyed to a relationship’s 
level of intimacy.  We do not expect lovers to “keep books on romance,”152 
but we do expect those conducting business at arms’ length to record their 
transactions.  In other words, the more intimate a relationship, the less legal 
regulation and enforcement the economic exchanges within the relationship 
receive.153 
Part of the rationale for not regulating or enforcing exchanges in inti-
mate relationships is that these exchanges are often treated as if they occupy 
a “sphere of life removed from the market.”154  Tax law in particular mani-
fests this logic.155  Only gains from market transactions count as income, 
and transactions in the most intimate relationship—marriage—are not con-
sidered market transactions.156  Thus, taxpayers need not claim transfers 
from their spouses as income.157  On the other hand, prostitution is deemed 
 
151  See supra Part II.B.2. 
152  Libby v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 69,184, at 997 (1969). 
153  As Jill Elaine Hasday asserts, “The law loudly denies enforcement to a variety of economic ex-
changes between husbands and wives,” including interspousal contracts for domestic services and sex.  
Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 499–501 (2005); see al-
so Noah D. Zatz, Sex Work/Sex Act: Law, Labor, and Desire in Constructions of Prostitution, 22 SIGNS 
277, 294 (1997). 
154  Hasday, supra note 153, at 499. 
155  Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REV. 93, 95 (2009) (“[T]ax law reflects an ef-
fort to restrict itself to the market sphere and steers away from personal attributes and relationships in 
order to preserve a market-free environment.”). 
156  Staudt, supra note 38, at 1575–76.  Staudt calls this distinction the “market proviso.”  Id. 
157  The Code does not categorize transfers between spouses as gifts per se but instead treats them as 
nonrecognition events.  I.R.C. § 1041(a) (2006) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of 
property from an individual to . . . a spouse . . . .”). 
The marital nonrecognition rule is clear, but scholars fiercely debate whether tax law should provide 
special treatment to married couples.  Numerous commentators note that Code provisions giving married 
couples special privileges and benefits have a normative basis.  See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER 145–66 (1995); Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the 
Internal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465 (2000); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social 
Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307 (2004); Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax 
Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129 (1998); William P. Kratzke, The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Is 
Bad Income Tax Policy, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 399, 406 (2005); Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as 
We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201 (2003); see also infra note 183.  Concerns other than bias have 
prompted others to condemn marital benefits such as those conferred by the joint income tax return.  For 
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an impersonal market transaction, one in which little or no intimacy exists, 
so gains from prostitution are considered income.158 
However, the mistress cases demonstrate the difficulty of trying to 
clearly distinguish between intimate relationships with nonmarket ex-
changes and impersonal relationships with market exchanges.  This prob-
lem arises because many relationships are not purely intimate or purely 
impersonal.159  Sexual relationships in particular occupy a spectrum of inti-
macy;160 in fact, “sexual activity often occurs without regard to intimacy or 
in varied forms of relationship to intimacy.”161  In determining whether the 
transfers between lovers were gifts or income in the mistress cases, the Tax 
Court struggled with relationships that lay somewhere on the spectrum be-
tween marriage and prostitution.162 
Questions about the relationship between economics and intimacy ex-
tend beyond the mistress context and into all areas of life in which econom-
ic motivations and activities intersect with nonmarket behaviors.163  At the 
heart of this discussion lies a normative debate about the desired relation-
ship between economics and intimacy.  Scholars on one side of this debate 
are concerned with “commodification”—they worry that allowing market 
concerns and market interests to invade personal relationships degrades the 
most valuable aspects of our selves: 
[C]ommodification . . . refers to the extent to which our bodies, our selves and 
our labor become commodities with a market exchange value, either literally, 
or rhetorically in the sense that we conceive of human bodies and capacities as 
 
example, Lily Kahng argues that the benefits conferred on married people by the joint return effectively 
penalize unmarried taxpayers.  Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint 
Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 657–60 (2010); see also James M. Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priori-
ties: Marriage Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1409, 1415–16 
(2010) (noting the “marriage penalt[ies]”). 
158  See Zatz, supra note 153, at 294 (“[I]n hegemonic Euro-American culture, sexuality and money 
are thought of as things that cannot, do not, and/or should not mix.  This separation is related at least in 
part to the attribution of money, commerce, and contract to the public realm of work and intimacy, de-
sire, and pleasure to the private realm of familial and other affective relationships.”); supra notes 27, 98. 
159  See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 16 (2005) (“[E]xactly where we set the 
limit between intimate and impersonal relations remains arbitrary.”). 
160  Id.; accord Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY 
L.J. 809, 835 (2010). 
161  Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 160, at 835. 
162  See supra Part II.B.3–4. 
163  Although this Comment discusses only tax cases, other courts confronting the intersection of 
economic exchange and intimacy often have difficulty maintaining strict distinctions between the two.  
Viviana A. Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 817, 827–28 (2000) (“[D]espite 
the specter of prostitution as the end point of any commodification in sexual relations, in practice courts 
and judges have not maintained a simple dichotomy of legitimate, nonmonetary sexual relations versus 
illegal monetized prostitution.”). 
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amenable to market value and reducible to a matter of satisfying economic pre-
ferences.164 
These “anticommodification” scholars object to the prospect of valuing 
human qualities on the market, insisting that such valuation diminishes per-
sonality and individuality.  They argue that treating human qualities in mar-
ket terms “allow[s] certain market norms to govern our treatment of a thing 
[and] expresses a mode of valuation not worthy of it.”165  A theorist taking 
this position might argue that when courts treat exchanges in mistress rela-
tionships as market interactions and thus imply that sex and companionship 
can be bargained for and purchased, they degrade the intrinsic value of sex 
and companionship that in fact are incommensurate with the market and 
cannot be valued appropriately in a market setting.  From an anticommodi-
fication perspective, such “legalized ‘commodification’ . . . has no place in 
intimate relationships.”166 
Scholars on the other side of this debate object to the law’s efforts to 
maintain the separation between economics and intimacy.  They argue that 
most human qualities can be valued on the market; they thus point to “the 
equivalence of all transfers as quid-pro-quo exchanges.”167  According to 
these theorists, the market can resolve all problems efficiently, including 
the problems associated with intimacy.168  Those supporting this theory 
might argue that when courts treat mistress relationships as nonmarket inte-
ractions in which transfers are not predicated on rationality or bargaining, 
courts miss the fact that all relationships—personal or otherwise—are noth-
ing but market exchanges. 
Exchange in the mistress cases more accurately involved what Marga-
ret Jane Radin calls “incompletely commodified” characteristics: these inte-
ractions were not completely inside or separate from the market but existed 
on a “continuum reflecting degrees of commodification that will be appro-
priate in a given context.”169  Interactions characterized by incomplete 
commodification tend to be more meaningful to the participants than the 
exchange of money might suggest: “market and non market aspects of an 
interaction coexist: although money changes hands, the interaction also has 
important nonmonetizable personal and social significance.”170  The mi-
 
164  Peter Halewood, On Commodification and Self-Ownership, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 131, 133 
(2008). 
165  Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 73 (1990). 
166  Hasday, supra note 153, at 492. 
167  Zelizer, supra note 163, at 825; see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 244 (1992) (charac-
terizing marriage as a contract to make the procurement of sex more efficient); Elisabeth M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 327–39 (1978) (advo-
cating for a free market in adoption). 
168  Zelizer, supra note 163, at 825. 
169  Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1918–19 (1987). 
170  Id. at 1918. 
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stress cases in which courts found paramours’ valuation of mistresses’ 
companionship irrational (not fully explicable in market terms)171 demon-
strate that sex and companionship occupy a netherworld of incomplete 
commodification.172 
However useful an incomplete-commodification analysis might be as 
description, it provides little insight into how such interactions should be 
treated by tax law.  Although some human qualities may be incompletely 
commodified, their exchange cannot be incompletely taxed.173  This analysis 
also demonstrates why market behavior cannot function as an appropriate 
proxy for intent: when relationships involve both the exchange of money 
and “nonmonetizable personal and social significance,”174 the participants 
are likely driven by both selfish and affectionate motivations.  For this rea-
son, in the mistress cases, courts using the market behavior of the mistress 
(prostitution)175 or of the paramour (rational valuation)176 failed as a practic-
al matter to provide a reliable proxy for the intent the Duberstein standard 
requires.  And when the proxy itself is ambiguous, the characteristic it subs-
titutes for cannot be clear. 
So if courts lack the evidence to infer intent, and the market-behavior 
proxy is inherently unreliable, is there a way for courts to apply the Dubers-
tein test in mistress cases?  I argue that courts cannot do so in any prin-
cipled manner because—even if evidence or an accurate proxy existed—
mistress relationships are not driven by a discernable dominant intent.  
Courts (and perhaps even the participants in these relationships) cannot 
identify a prevailing intent because, while participants may hope for reci-
procation, enough risk is present in the exchange that reciprocation cannot 
be assured enough to be the participants’ motivation for making the ex-
change. 
To draw on the language of sociology, mistress relationships are “ex-
change relations”—those in which “the giving and receiving of gifts are es-
 
171  See supra Part II.B.4. 
172  See Radin, supra note 169, at 1923 (“[W]omen’s sexuality is incompletely commodified.  Many 
sexual relationships may have both market and nonmarket aspects: relationships may be entered into and 
sustained partly for economic reasons and partly for the interpersonal sharing that is part of our ideal of 
human flourishing.”); see also United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1132 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[Mistress 
relationships] would not be long term were it not for some respect or affection.  Yet, it may be equally 
clear that the relationship[s] would not continue were it not for financial support or payments.”). 
173  Radin makes some suggestions for legal treatment of women’s sexuality.  She suggests decrimi-
nalizing prostitution but criminalizing the most egregious capitalistic aspects of the prostitution busi-
ness, such as pimping and recruitment.  Radin, supra note 169, at 1924.  But in the absence of such 
radical reform, her characterizing sexuality as incompletely commodified gives little guidance about 
how the exchange of sex should be treated by the law. 
174  Id. at 1918. 
175  See supra Part II.B. 
176  See supra Part II.B.4. 
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sential to cementing social relations and are never properly completed.”177  
In these relationships, one person gives another person a gift as a gesture of 
trust; when that generosity is reciprocated, further relations are “easier and 
more fluid.”178  Under this view, gift-giving functions not as a discrete event 
but as an anticipation of future exchanges.179  Trying to identify a single mo-
tivation in an exchange relation may be impossible given that altruism and 
self-interest are bound up in a complex cycle of risk-taking, reliance, and 
the hope—although not the guarantee—of reciprocation. 
The law’s inability to discern a single motivation underlying exchange 
relations can be further attributed to the fact that social exchange far ex-
ceeds the range of exchange recognized by the law.  Social exchange “oc-
curs as a matter of social practice and customary understandings”180 and 
necessarily encompasses a broader range of behavior than the law accounts 
for.181  The much narrower category of legal exchange includes those prac-
tices that are “enforced by the legal system and hinge[] on the transfer of 
legal right or entitlement.”182  This distinction implies that, although the law 
can distinguish between categories of relationships that have legal defini-
tions (e.g., mistress relationships versus marriages), it cannot reliably dis-
tinguish between different types within those categories (e.g., those mistress 
relationships that are more affectionate versus those that are more selfish).  
As such, the categorical distinction is the only one the law is capable of 
making because it is the only one characterized by legal formality (or a lack 
thereof).183 
 
177  Rose, supra note 59, at 316.  Similar language pervades other social science disciplines.  As 
anthropologist Marcel Mauss described gifts: 
A considerable part of our morality and our lives themselves are . . . permeated with this . . . at-
mosphere of the gift, where obligation and liberty intermingle.  Fortunately everything is still not 
wholly categorized in terms of buying and selling.  Things still have sentimental as well as venal 
value, assuming values merely of this kind exist.  We possess more than a tradesman morality. 
MAUSS, supra note 59, at 65.  Elsewhere Mauss refers to gift exchange as “apparently free and disinte-
rested but nevertheless constrained and self-interested.”  Id. at 3. 
178  Rose, supra note 59, at 316. 
179  Id.; see also BLAU, supra note 59, at 91 (“‘Social exchange’ . . . refers to voluntary actions of 
individuals that are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring 
from others.”). 
180  Hasday, supra note 153, at 496. 
181  See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 3–4 (2000) (discussing the relationship be-
tween the varied and intricate “nonlegal mechanisms of cooperation” that are only occasionally recog-
nized or enforced by law). 
182  Hasday, supra note 153, at 497. 
183  This argument relies on the assumption that parties are able to freely choose between marriage 
and other forms of domestic ordering.  All of the mistress–paramour relationships discussed in this 
Comment were heterosexual relationships in which partners had the legal right to marry and file federal 
taxes jointly but chose to organize their relationships in a less formal way (either because they were al-
ready married to someone else and chose to start another relationship or because their personal prefe-
rence dictated against marriage).  However, when the government enacts legislation preventing some 
people from freely selecting from the full range of available formal relationship organizations, see De-
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Thus, the only question remaining is how to categorize mistress rela-
tionships—as those in which most transfers are gifts or those in which most 
transfers constitute income.  Recall that in Duberstein, the Supreme Court 
determined that, when a businessman gave a professional contact a Cadil-
lac, this transfer constituted income to the transferee.  If the Duberstein re-
lationship was considered an exchange relationship because the Cadillac 
was given in the hope (but not with the certainty) that more useful business 
contacts would be provided, then the distinction between a Cadillac and 
companionship is less pronounced than it might first appear.  In the next 
Part, I argue that to remedy the imprecision and uncertainty in the donor’s 
intent standard, future mistress cases should be governed by a clear rule ca-
tegorizing all transfers in mistress relationships as income. 
IV. KEEPING BOOKS ON ROMANCE: A NONMARITAL INCOME RULE 
When taxpayers do not know what the law is, they cannot follow it.  In 
the tax context, this lack of clarity means that the state can lose revenue,184 
taxpayers who perform substantially the same activities can receive differ-
ent tax treatment,185 and judges can have difficulty finding principled 
grounds upon which to base their decisions.186  As the Seventh Circuit’s de-
 
fense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 2–3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. 
§ 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)), courts cannot assume that parties have chosen the level of legal recog-
nition for their relationships that they prefer.  As such, in these cases, courts may have to take a func-
tional approach by defining the relationship by how well its features match formal legal relationships. 
184  See Striz, supra note 60, at 1082 (“The direct correlation between complexity and noncom-
pliance evidences that year after year, as the complexity of tax law increases, taxpayers are less able to 
comply.  If tax law were simplified, greater compliance would result, which would produce a smaller tax 
gap.” (footnote omitted)); see also Dave Rifkin, A Primer on the “Tax Gap” and Methodologies for Re-
ducing It, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 379 (2009) (“Noncompliance may be intentional (e.g., deliberate-
ly underreporting income), unintentional (e.g., underreporting income because the taxpayer did not 
understand that the amount was income, calculating a credit that is confusing and/or complex, or inad-
vertently claiming the incorrect filing status), or both.”). 
185  Horizontal equity is one of the cornerstones of tax policy; it “demands that similarly situated in-
dividuals face similar tax burdens.”  David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 43 (2006).  Elkins also offers a brief summary of the philosophy underly-
ing horizontal equity and its history.  Id. at 43 n.1.  Horizontal equity differs from vertical equity in that 
the latter attempts to create equality by redistributing wealth, whereas the former attempts to maintain 
equality by taxing similarly situated actors the same.  See Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the 
Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919, 925 (1997).  Horizontal equity protects against the arbi-
trary enforcement of the laws.  Id. 
There is some lively scholarly discussion about the normative value of the principle of horizontal 
equity.  See Elkins, supra; Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992); 
Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139 (1989); Paul 
R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 
1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX 
REV. 354 (1993); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1990). 
186  See supra Part II. 
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cision in United States v. Harris187 and the Tax Court decisions in the mi-
stress cases188 demonstrate, the law governing transfers from paramours to 
mistresses manifests vagueness and inflicts unfairness. 
To remedy this vagueness, this Part suggests a simple default rule: The 
Code should treat all transfers to mistresses as income taxable to the mi-
stress.  Section A discusses the benefits of adopting a clear rule—benefits 
that a flexible standard like the donor’s intent standard cannot provide.  
Section B addresses some of the practical concerns associated with imple-
menting such a rule: minimizing the costs of creating and implementing the 
rule and avoiding overinclusion by defining the rule’s boundaries as nar-
rowly as possible.  Section C addresses questions of ensuring compliance 
by introducing provisions that would phase the rule in gradually and would 
provide certain legal assurances to mistresses. 
A. Creating a Clear Rule 
The rule is simple.  Instead of attempting to parse the minutiae of rela-
tionships to determine whether romance or economics prevails in mistress 
relationships, courts should presume that transfers to mistresses in long-
term, nonmarital relationships constitute taxable income to mistresses under 
§ 61(a) of the Code.  A clear rule will provide notice to taxpayers, give 
courts clarity in their decisionmaking, and allow mistresses and their para-
mours to plan their behavior with certainty about the law. 
The distinction between the donor’s intent standard and a default in-
come rule distinguishes “standards” and “rules” more generally: a rule spe-
cifies the type of conduct that conforms to or violates the rule and requires 
adjudicators only to consider factual information to determine whether 
someone has violated the law, whereas a standard leaves the determination 
of what kind of conduct conforms or violates the standard to the adjudica-
tor.189  A simple rule (borrowed from Louis Kaplow) might prohibit “driv-
ing in excess of 55 miles per hour on expressways.”190  In determining 
 
187  See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text. 
188  See supra notes 79–145 and accompanying text. 
189  See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 
(1992).  My discussion of rules and standards makes broad strokes and certainly oversimplifies the dis-
tinction between rules and standards.  The distinction in the gift–income context, however, is fairly sim-
ple, so this section avoids emphasizing the more complex aspects of the rule–standard relationship.  
Numerous scholars have considered these concepts in more detail.  See generally, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (evaluat-
ing the rule-versus-standard distinction in the context of common economic concepts such as efficiency 
and utility); Kaplow, supra (discussing rules and standards in the context of economic decisionmaking); 
Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997) (consider-
ing the role that social norms play in rendering rules or standards optimal); Pierre Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (examining the distinction between rules and standards, and 
questioning the simplicity with which legal scholars distinguish the two). 
190  Kaplow, supra note 189, at 560. 
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whether a driver has violated this rule, the adjudicator need only consider 
facts (whether or not the driver’s speed exceeded fifty-five miles per hour).  
A standard that addressed the same category of conduct might prohibit 
“driving at an excessive speed on expressways.”191  This standard requires 
the adjudicator to determine both what constitutes “excessive speed” and 
whether a driver had in fact been driving at that speed. 
Rules and standards each have both benefits and drawbacks.  Rules 
draw sharp lines that give clear guidance to actors about what conduct vi-
olates the rule and render adjudication more straightforward by limiting the 
range of questions that judges must address.192  After all, vague law creates 
“uncertainty about who and what will come within the law’s proscrip-
tion.”193  But the rigidity of rules is also their weakness: a bright line means 
that courts will punish behavior violating the law in fact but not in spirit.  In 
contrast, standards provide flexibility and allow adjudicators to judge each 
situation individually, permitting them to determine if the behavior in ques-
tion is the kind of behavior the law was promulgated to regulate.194  But this 
flexibility also means that decisionmakers are likely to reach erratic results, 
especially when considering behavior that falls on the borderline of the 
conduct the law was meant to regulate.195 
The donor’s intent principle as applied in the mistress cases certainly 
qualifies as a standard: All evaluation of whether the behavior meets the 
standard takes place long after the transfers have been made.  Because most 
gifts are given with elements of both altruism and self-interest,196 it is diffi-
cult for a donor to know at the time whether his conduct has the appropriate 
amount of altruism to constitute the transfer as a gift to the donee.  And if 
the donor himself is unsure, how might the recipient gain any clarity about 
the donor’s motivations?  After all, the taxpayer–recipient of the transfer is 
the party who bears the risk of misinterpreting the donor’s intent.  Given 
that the proportion of altruism to self-interest is likely unclear to the giver 
himself, the recipient’s efforts to determine how the transfers should be 
treated for tax purposes is at best speculative.  As such, the donor’s intent 
standard provides little guidance to mistresses about what they should do to 
conform to the law: they must guess and hope that the Tax Court will agree. 
A de facto income rule for transfers to mistresses, however, resolves 
problems of notice, certainty, and clarity.  Dictating that all transfers to mi-
stresses constitute income saves mistresses from engaging in mindreading 
to determine the tax status of the transfers.  Courts need not undertake ex-
 
191  Id. 
192  See Schlag, supra note 189, at 384–85. 
193  Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision 
in the Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 541 (1994). 
194  Schlag, supra note 189, at 385. 
195  Id. 
196  See supra notes 59, 177–79 and accompanying text. 
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tended post hoc analyses of the scant evidence of intent to determine 
whether such transfers are income to the mistress. 
It is worth noting that a rule cutting the other way—a nonmarital non-
income rule—could not achieve the same clarity and simplicity.  It will al-
ways be the case that some mistresses (namely, prostitutes) will be required 
to report their gains as income.197  For example, if a woman works as a pros-
titute in a jurisdiction where prostitution is legal, her gains from prostitution 
will clearly be treated as income.  However, a discussion of gains from her 
personal relationships will necessarily provoke questions of intent.  In other 
words, maintaining any distinction between gifts and income in the mi-
stressing realm simply invites courts and litigants to replicate the mistress 
cases’ arguments about affection versus self-interest.  Perpetuating this am-
biguity creates anything but clarity. 
Rules create clarity and consistency in the law, but they also present 
risks.  One danger is that of overinclusion: In order to effectively address 
the narrow situation at which it is aimed, the rule must prevent catching 
other types of relationships in its broad net.  Another danger is cost: The 
gift standard is time-consuming and uncertain in adjudication, but an in-
come rule will require greater specificity at the outset and thus could be 
costly to write.  Finally, a de facto rule might simply shift the debate from 
one aspect of the problem to another—for example, instead of parsing the 
question of intent, courts may expend their efforts determining who is a 
“mistress.”  The next section addresses these concerns. 
B. Assessing Potential Weaknesses 
1. Preventing Overinclusion.—One potential concern about a de fac-
to income rule for mistresses is that it will cover a number of relationships 
and transfers not of the type considered here.  For example, in its simple 
form expressed in section A, the de facto income rule could plausibly en-
compass transfers made between same-sex couples who live together but 
are prevented by law from marrying or forming a civil union—not the type 
of informal, occasionally transitory relationship envisioned by the rule.198  
The rule could also require reporting of token gifts in short-term dating re-
lationships—also not the aim of the rule.  To avoid overinclusion, the rule 
should incorporate two safe harbors to exclude some exchanges in these re-
lationships from taxation.  These provisions would exclude exchanges be-
tween lovers who share a principal residence or who exchange only token 
gifts. 
 
197  See supra notes 27 and 98 for a discussion of the fact that gains from prostitution—both legal 
and illegal—must be claimed as taxable income. 
198  Some overinclusion problems could be resolved by removing the unconstitutional barriers that 
prevent same-sex couples from marrying that exist in many states.  A discussion of these laws, however, 
exceeds the scope of this Comment. 
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a. Safe harbor: cohabitation.—Lovers who share a principal 
residence would be excluded from the nonmarital income rule.  Cohabita-
tion includes so many de minimis transactions, exchanges, and shared costs 
that gift and income rules are immensely difficult to administer.199  The 
Code usually excludes transactions that are difficult to enforce, including 
most intrafamily transfers.200  In addition, state law generally is responsible 
for defining cohabitation relationships through common-law marriage poli-
cies, domestic partnership rules, and civil union laws.201 
One concern with the cohabitation safe harbor is that it will simply 
shift the dispute from the intent question to the cohabitation question.  If a 
woman’s lover purchases a house for her, she may wish to claim that they 
are cohabiting in order to avoid paying income tax on transfers.  This prob-
 
199  This is not to say that the law concerning unmarried cohabitation is unproblematic.  In Pascarel-
li v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that transfers between long-term, intimate cohabitants do not 
constitute income.  55 T.C. 1082, 1091 (1971) (“These circumstances led us to find that the petitioner 
did not perform services for Mr. DeAngelis for the purpose of obtaining compensation, but rather with 
the same spirit of cooperation that would motivate a wife to strive to help her husband advance in his 
business.”), aff’d, 485 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1973); see also Green v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 87,503, at 
2711 (1987) (“[P]ayments in exchange for ‘wifely services’ are not compensation within the meaning of 
section 61 even when the provider is not legally a wife.” (citing Pascarelli, 55 T.C. 1082)).  But the tax 
laws concerning transfers between unmarried cohabitants tend to be more complex than Pascarelli im-
plies.  See Frank S. Berall, Estate Planning Considerations for Unmarried Same or Opposite Sex Coha-
bitants, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 361 (2004); Cain, supra note 157; Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-
Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 360–62 (1995); Melvyn B. Frumkes, Taxation of Same-Sex 
Marriage and Live-Ins, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 117 (2009); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, 
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 
(1993); Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 
27 UCLA L. REV. 1240 (1980).  For an in-depth discussion of the legal state of “nonmarriage,” see Arie-
la R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000).  See 
also Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of Common-Law 
Marriage, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483 (2007); Jennifer Thomas, Comment, Common Law 
Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 151 (2009). 
200  See supra note 157.  As Henry Simons points out, the exclusion of intrafamily transfers is pri-
marily an administrative consideration: “The appropriate measures [required to include intrafamily 
household transfers in taxable income] are forbidding from the standpoint of administration; and we may 
be reconciled to the ignoring of gifts in many such cases.”  SIMONS, supra note 32, at 136.  The same 
logic, as I argue here, applies to household transfers in general. 
201  There is no Code provision that explicitly deals with unmarried cohabitants, although the Code 
does specify that only heterosexual married couples may file joint tax returns.  I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2006).  
Federal legislation passed in 1996 indirectly affected state tax treatment of same-sex relationships by 
dictating that only heterosexual couples could avail themselves of the legal and social benefits of mar-
riage.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).  A number of sources discuss unmarried cohabitation and taxation.  See, 
e.g., Berall, supra note 199 (discussing estate planning strategies for unmarried, cohabitating couples); 
Chase, supra note 199, at 361–62 (discussing the difference in tax treatment between heterosexual mar-
ried couples and same-sex, unmarried couples); Cain, supra note 157 (discussing the tax consequences 
for unmarried same-sex cohabitants); Frumkes, supra note 199 (collecting court decisions concerning 
the taxation of long-term nonmarital relationships); Kornhauser, supra note 199 (discussing different 
definitions of family, including those relationships that include shared residences); Wolk, supra note 
199 (comparing the tax consequences of economic exchanges for married and unmarried cohabitants). 
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lem can be avoided by using the “principal residence” concept already dep-
loyed in other areas of tax law.  For example, Code § 121(a) distinguishes 
between income gained from the sale of a taxpayer’s principal residence 
and from sales of other property.202  The Treasury Regulations list a number 
of factors for courts to consider when determining which residence consti-
tutes the taxpayer’s principal residence: the taxpayer’s use of the property, 
where the rest of his family abides, and the address on his driver’s li-
cense.203  Thus whether a mistress and her paramour have the same principal 
residence would be determined by assessing these factors for both lovers. 
b. Safe harbor: de minimis transactions.—Women who receive 
only token gifts would also not be subject to the nonmarital income rule.  
The difficulty with establishing this safe harbor lies in defining what consti-
tutes a token gift.  As with the principal residence question, the question of 
setting a reporting threshold for gifts can be borrowed from existing tax 
law.  The rule could establish that mistresses must report if the amount of 
gifts they receive exceeds $13,000 per year; they need not report below that 
threshold.  This rule has its basis in the Code’s gift tax provision, which re-
quires that the donor pay tax if his transfers to a donee exceed $13,000 in a 
tax year.204  The federal gift tax is not a tax on income but is more properly 
considered part of the estate tax—Congress created it to prevent people 
from avoiding the estate tax with inter vivos transfers.205  However, the gift 
tax threshold provides a useful indication of what transfers the government 
considers large enough to require reporting and taxation.  This limitation 
 
202  I.R.C. § 121(a). 
203  Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(2) (2006) (“If a taxpayer alternates between 2 properties . . . the proper-
ty that the taxpayer uses a majority of the time during the year ordinarily will be considered the taxpay-
er’s principal residence.  In addition . . . relevant factors . . . include . . . (i) The taxpayer’s place of 
employment; (ii) The principal place of abode of the taxpayer’s family members; (iii) The address listed 
on the taxpayer’s federal and state tax returns, driver’s license, automobile registration, and voter regis-
tration card; (iv) The taxpayer’s mailing address for bills and correspondence; (v) The location of the 
taxpayer’s banks; and (vi) The location of religious organizations and recreational clubs with which the 
taxpayer is affiliated.”). 
204  See I.R.C. § 2503. 
205  The federal gift tax was enacted in part to prevent people from avoiding the estate tax by trans-
ferring wealth inter vivos rather than by devise.  See H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 27–28 (1932).  When 
Congress enacted the estate tax in 1916, taxpayers responded by making gifts in their lifetimes instead 
of making testamentary transfers.  Jay A. Soled, Reassigning and Assessing the Role of the Gift Tax, 
83 B.U. L. REV. 401, 402–03 (2003).  As such, the gift tax is not related to income; its purpose is to sup-
port the estate tax.  Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making It Enforcea-
ble, 87 B.U. L. REV. 759, 761–62 (2007) (“Unlike other taxes, the gift tax does not serve an independent 
function.  Rather, Congress designed it to protect the integrity of the estate tax and income tax. . . .  
While arguments continue about the justification for the estate tax, no one has argued that the estate tax 
can be effectively enforced without a gift tax: in the absence of a gift tax, the estate tax could be too eas-
ily defeated by lifetime gifts.” (footnotes omitted)).  It is thus focused on transactions from the prospec-
tive target of the statute—the potential tax-avoidant donor—not the recipients. 
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will keep the IRS from pursuing cases in which the amount of money con-
cerned is de minimis.206 
The $13,000 minimum would include all realized gains—those typical-
ly defined as “income” under § 61(a) and relevant case law.207  If a para-
mour pays his lover’s rent, for example, the value of the rent would 
constitute income.  This provision would likely eliminate transfers in more 
casual relationships and encompass those made in relationships where pay-
ments from one lover constitute a substantial part of the other lover’s in-
come. 
Unlike the gift tax, in which the yearly $13,000 exemption is limited to 
transactions from one donor to one donee,208 the $13,000 threshold would 
not be limited to gifts from one donor.  For example, if a mistress had two 
lovers, each of whom gave her $7000 in the same year, she would claim 
both amounts as income because the total amount of the gifts exceeds the 
$13,000 threshold.  The purpose of including the aggregate value of trans-
fers is to adequately capture the gain to the mistress—to correctly represent 
her income.  Income is measured from the perspective of the donee, unlike 
the gift tax, which is meant to capture the transfer of wealth from the pers-
pective of the donor.209  In this respect, the nonmarital income rule more 
strongly resembles self-employment provisions, which measure the mini-
mum reporting amount from the perspective of the person who receives the 
income, not the person who pays it.210 
The $13,000 safe harbor would also contain an opt-out provision.  If 
the donor wishes the transfer to be tax-free to the donee, he can file a gift 
tax return and pay the tax on it himself.  This opt-out provision affords the 
donor a measure of choice but requires that his intent be expressed objec-
tively.  Without a gift tax return, courts would presume that the value of any 
transfers that exceeded the yearly exclusion constituted income. 
2. Mitigating Promulgation Costs.—Declaring that transfers to mi-
stresses must be claimed by the recipients as income would be only the first 
step in promulgating this rule.  A number of other questions need to be 
answered in order to make the rule practically applicable: As what kind of 
 
206  It is not unusual for Congress to add provisions to the Code to decrease the number of low-value 
cases heard by the courts.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 165(h) (allowing casualty deductions only if they exceed 
10% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income). 
207  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001 (providing for the “[d]etermination of amount of and recognition of gain 
or loss”); id. § 305 (providing exceptions for certain “[d]istributions of stock and stock rights”); Pulsifer 
v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 245, 247 (1975) (holding that income is taxable when the taxpayer has received the 
“economic benefit” of the income); Amend v. Comm’r, 13 T.C. 178, 182 (1949) (holding that income is 
taxable when it has been “constructively received”); see also supra notes 18–27 and accompanying text. 
208  I.R.C. § 2503(b) allows a donor to exclude each year up to $13,000 of gifts made to each donee. 
209  See supra note 205. 
210  If net earnings from self-employment are less than $400, the taxpayer need not claim them as in-
come.  I.R.C. § 1402(b)(2).  Self-employment income is cumulative—measured by the amount of in-
come received regardless of the number of sources.  See I.R.C. § 1402(a)–(b). 
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income should these transfers be classified?  What kind of withholding is 
required?  What enforcement procedures apply?  The numerous complex 
questions that must be answered before such a law can be promulgated re-
quire some “investigation and deliberation”—administrative factfinding and 
decisionmaking about the provisions best able to achieve the rule’s goals.211 
This time-consuming and costly process can be avoided, however, if 
mistress income is placed in one of the categories of income already defined 
by the Code.  Such income fits most logically into the Code’s self-
employment provisions, which already contain detailed reporting and with-
holding requirements212 that are unlikely to require any adaptation to the 
special situation of mistresses.  Like self-employed people, mistresses are in 
the best position to report their own income.  Thus they would be required 
to file a tax return reporting their yearly mistress income.  They would also 
be required to pay taxes at the applicable rate, withholding their own Social 
Security and other taxes.  As in self-employment reporting, if a mistress has 
more than one source of income (more than one paramour), she would 
combine these sources of income when reporting. 
3. Avoiding Fighting the Same Battle on Different Grounds.—A final 
concern about creating a default nonmarital income rule is that doing so 
will not resolve the problems inherent in the donor’s intent standard.  In-
stead of arguing about intent, parties may instead argue about whether a 
woman is a mistress.  One can imagine that this argument could also turn on 
questions of intent: Did the parties intend a mistress–paramour relationship, 
or were they just friends?  The cohabitation and token-gift safe harbors re-
solve some of these concerns, but failing to clearly define what kind of rela-
tionships the rule covers will invite dispute over who must conform with 
the rule. 
Avoiding these problems is one reason I have dubbed the rule a “non-
marital” income rule rather than a “mistress” rule.  It might be more accu-
rate to say that the rule would cover all intimate relationships in which 
transfers are not accounted for by other provisions in the Code.  Transfers 
between friends, for example, might be subject to the rule and its provi-
sions.  Transfers between spouses would not be covered by the rule because 
other provisions of the Code already address these transfers.  Transfers 
from employers to employees would not fall under the rule for the same 
reason. 
Some might argue that broadening the rule to include all affectionate, 
nonfamilial relationships goes too far—that only extramarital sexual rela-
tionships should fall within the rule’s scope.  Upon examination, however, 
it is difficult to find a principled justification for making distinctions be-
tween different kinds of affectionate relationships.  In 2001, the Law Com-
 
211  Kaplow, supra note 189, at 569. 
212  See I.R.C. §§ 1401–1403. 
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mission of Canada came to a similar conclusion, determining that there are 
no justifications for legally distinguishing between different personal rela-
tionships for the purposes of taxation.213 
Aside from this theoretical point, covering all affectionate adult rela-
tionships under the rule would prevent litigants from simply shifting the in-
tent argument to a different ground.  As the mistress cases demonstrate, it is 
virtually impossible to coherently distinguish between personal relation-
ships that are not already defined by law.214 
C. Ensuring Compliance 
Promulgating a clear rule does not necessarily ensure that taxpayers 
will follow the rule.  The difficulty with new tax rules is implementation—
making certain that people whom the rule affects know about the rule and 
are incented to abide by it.  Consider the widespread noncompliance with 
tax law, which creates a substantial gap between the government’s actual 
and owed tax revenue every year.215  Noncompliance increases when tax-
payers themselves are responsible for reporting their own income to the 
IRS,216 as mistresses would be under the nonmarital income rule. 
The possibility of noncompliance does not suggest that the nonmarital 
income rule should not be implemented, however.  The IRS could take 
steps to ensure compliance.  First, in order to allow time for implementa-
tion, the application of penalties could be phased in gradually.  Mistresses 
who do not report their mistress income within the first few years that the 
statute is in effect should have to pay back taxes but should not be subject 
to any other penalties for noncompliance.217  Otherwise, the penalty for not 
knowing about the new rule would be too high. 
 
213  For a discussion of the Law Commission’s report, Beyond Conjugality, see Polikoff, supra note 
157, at 203–04.  The Commission asserted that “governments need to pursue a more comprehensive and 
principled approach to the legal recognition and support of the full range of close personal relationships 
among adults.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In her proposal for a marriage-neutral tax policy, 
Shari Motro suggests that “platonic friendships [that] evolve into income-sharing partnerships” should 
have access to the joint income tax return, now reserved for married couples.  Shari Motro, A New “I 
Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1549 (2006).  A handful of 
scholars have made similar arguments, focusing on the reasons for legally recognizing friendship.  E.g., 
David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, a Status Other Than Marriage, 
76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347 (2001); Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631 
(2007); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007). 
214  See supra Parts II.B, III. 
215  The “tax gap” for the most recent tax year available (2001) was $345 billion.  JAMES M. 
BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33882, TAX GAP AND TAX ENFORCEMENT 2 (2007).  According 
to the IRS, the “gross tax gap [is] the difference between the aggregate tax liability imposed by law for a 
given tax year and the amount of tax that taxpayers pay voluntarily and timely for that year.”  Id. at 1 
(emphasis omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
216  Rifkin, supra note 184, at 384. 
217  For a discussion of the penalties the IRS can impose on unpaid taxes, see supra note 68. 
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Second, the rule would need to be explicit that being a mistress is not 
connected to prostitution.  Otherwise, mistresses might worry that filing 
would mark them as prostitutes or, worse, be used against them in a crimi-
nal charge for prostitution.  This fear might prevent them from filing and 
thus might defeat the purpose of the rule.  As such, the rule should make 
explicit the fact that filing mistress income can have no other legal ramifica-
tions. 
Third, the benefits of the rule to mistresses would need to be made ap-
parent to encourage compliance.  Few people are thrilled to pay taxes, so 
the nonmarital income rule would put an immediate burden on donees that 
they would probably prefer not to bear.218  Although taxation imposes a 
burden, it also provides individual benefits that are available only to those 
who pay taxes.219  Unlike gift recipients, income earners pay a percentage of 
their earned income in payroll tax and are entitled to benefits (such Social 
Security and Medicare) when they retire or become disabled based on these 
contributions.220  Mistresses may access these social welfare benefits 
through other avenues—e.g., employment or marriage221—but taxpayers re-
ceive greater benefits when they have more income.222  Making these bene-
fits more apparent—perhaps during the penalty phase-in period—might en-
encourage compliance with the rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Tax law relies heavily on detailed facts and circumstances.  This fact-
dependency may explain the extraordinary complexity of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, which expands as the range of potential taxpayer situations 
grows.223  Fact-dependency may also explain why courts are reluctant to ac-
cept bright-line tax rules: courts may worry that such clear distinctions will 
create unfairness by addressing only the form, rather than the underlying 
substance, of transactions. 
 
218  See Carolyn C. Jones, Mapping Tax Narratives, 73 TUL. L. REV. 653, 668–70 (1998) (detailing 
the ubiquity of tax horror stories and tax resistance narratives); Kirk J. Stark, The Right To Vote on Tax-
es, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 212 (2001) (describing the political and social resistance to income tax). 
219  Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 67 
(1996). 
220  Staudt, supra note 38, at 1597–98. 
221  See id.  Derivative benefits also pose more risk to women than do direct benefits.  Staudt notes 
that “due to severe limitations found in the rules, many married women fail to ever get the benefits.”  Id. 
at 1597 n.105; see also Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional 
Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2059–66 (1996) (discussing and evaluating suggested feminist re-
forms to the Social Security system). 
222  Staudt, supra note 38, at 1598. 
223  See Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental 
Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 164 (1997) (“Any particular combination of coherence, trac-
tability, and complication is unstable as changes in background facts pressure the regime to produce a 
new combination of the three types of complexity.”). 
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However, a highly fact-specific inquiry may be futile in contexts that 
produce little objective evidence.  In the mistress cases, the absence of a 
clear standard about whether transfers between unmarried lovers in long-
term, non-cohabitating relationships were gifts or income resulted in deci-
sions that did not clearly delineate the tax consequences of gains from mi-
stress relationships.  This is a natural result of courts’ efforts to distinguish 
economic from emotional motivations in relationships that likely involve 
both.  This Comment has proposed a clear default rule to replace courts’ ar-
bitrary and inevitably imprecise assessments. 
Although this Comment is focused narrowly—examining the gift ex-
clusion in the context of a precisely defined set of circumstances—the prob-
lems that plagued the Tax Court’s gift–income decisions in the mistress 
cases likely extend to the gift exclusion generally.  A combination of affec-
tion and self-interest exists in most relationships, yet the donor’s intent test 
applies to transfers in all personal relationships outside families.  Predicat-
ing consequential legal distinctions on taxpayers’ proportion of affection for 
others is a project doomed to failure—or, at least, to inconsistent adjudica-
tion.  Clear rules can cure this vagueness.  Love itself may be uncertain, 
amorphous, and unpredictable, but the tax consequences of love need not 
be. 
